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• The four alternative plans under consideration will 
generate oil and gas industry sales of between 
$433 and $554 million per year from Moffat 
County.” 
 
• The chosen alternative will generate between 800 
and 1,000 local jobs per year. 
 
• The total tax effect of the local oil and gas industry 
on public lands will be $20-$27 million per year. 
 
• The approximately 20% variation across alterna-
tives is driven by the degree to which BLM lands 
are open to the industry. 
 
• Total impact variation is reduced by expected in-
creases in other affected industries.    
 
Introduction 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is part of the 
US Department of the Interior responsible for the man-
agement and conservation of resources on 258 million 
surface acres, as well as 700 million acres of subsur-
face mineral estate. These public lands make up about 
13 percent of the total land surface of the United States 
and more than 40 percent of all land managed by the 
federal government. BLM Colorado and all BLM 
lands adhere to the principal of multiple-use manage-
ment outlined by the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976. This means that the BLM balances 
outdoor recreation and preservation of wildlife habitat, 
air and water, and other scenic and historical values 
with environmentally responsible commercial develop-
ment of the land and its resources.2 
 
The Little Snake Field Office (LSFO) includes aproxi-
mately 4.2 million acres of land in Moffat, Routt, and 
Rio Blanco Counties. The Little Snake Resource Man-
agement Plan Planning Area (RMPPA) within that area 
administers approximately 1.3 million acres of public 
land surface and mineral estate and 1.1 million acres of 
federal mineral estate where the surface is privately 
owned or state-owned. Of the 6 counties that have 
acreage within the RMPPA boundary, the economic 
effects will arguably impact Moffat County the most, 
as the overwhelming majority of BLM surface and 
subsurface land that will be affected by the new LSFO 
Resource Management Plan (RMP) lie within it. Some 
95% of surface land owned by the BLM that lies 
within the RMPPA is within Moffat County (Table 1).  
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Therefore, the individual economic impact analysis of 
the natural resource based industries in the RMPPA 
under the different RMP alternatives will focus on the 
impacts found in Moffat County.  
 
 
The goal of this research series is to inform the public 
regarding the economic tradeoffs and impacts the pro-
posed LSFO RMP alternatives will have on the natural 
resource based economic activities on BLM properties 





















Table 1: LSFO-Managed Surface Ownership by County 
County 
  
Acres of County 
within RMPPA 
Boundary 
Acres of Surface Ownership 
BLM LSFO Other Federal 
Agencies 
State of Colorado Private 
  
Moffat 2,620,700 1,285,200 136,000 183,500 1,016,000 
Routt 1,399,300 59,900 566,700 68,100 704,600 
Rio Blanco 133,800 4,300 107,900 0 21,600 
Garfield 36,300 0 36,100 0 200 
Grand 30,000 0 29,800 100 100 
Jackson 1,600 0 1,600 0 0 
Total 4,221,700 1,349,400 878,100 251,700 1,742,500 
 














































































Revising the LSFO RMP 
Each surface and subsurface area under the manage-
ment of the BLM has a field office which implements 
and enforces an RMP specifically designed for the 
property encompassed within the field office territory. 
An RMP can require modest revisions or even a com-
plete reconstitution due to changes in public use and 
shifting demands for recreation, agriculture and live-
stock grazing, oil and gas productivity, and other    
factors. 
 
The LSFO RMP was revised three times since its    
implementation in 1989. In 2001, the LSFO RMP   
began to consider the process of a complete review and 
revision due to the rise of management and travel con-
cerns within the oil and gas industry, input from    
Moffat County and concerns of several environmental 
organizations. The Northwest Colorado Stewardship 
(NWCOS) and the BLM developed a collaborative 
strategy to revise the LSFO RMP in the spring of 2004. 
When the Little Snake RMP is completed, it will pro-
vide a comprehensive framework for managing the 
BLM-administered public lands and resources and  
allocating their uses in the RMPPA. One of the four 
alternatives detailed below will be chosen according to 
a defined political process, as outlined in Section 1.5 of 
the 2007 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
for the Little Snake RMP, and this economic analysis 
attempts to provide answers to the expected outcomes 
of that choice.3 
 
LSFO RMP Alternatives 
Four alternatives (A, B, C, and D) are described and 
examined in this analysis, each representing varying 
levels of management actions for each resource and 
resource use based on achieving the goals and objec-
tives of the given alternative. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) requires a no action alterna-
tive, and thus, Alternative A provides a status quo   
basis to compare the impacts of the differing alterna-
tives.  
 
Alternative B would allow the greatest extent of      
resource use within the RMPPA, while maintaining the 
basic protection required for managing resources.   
Under this alternative, protection of resources would 
be the least restrictive within the limits defined by law, 
meaning current designated protections such as areas 
of critical environmental concern (ACEC) and special 
recreation management areas (SRMA) would be     
removed, no new wild and scenic river (WSR) corri-
dors would be recommended for designation, and    
opportunities for “unmanaged” motorized recreational 
experiences would increase. With this alternative, 
unlike Alternative A, areas designated as no surface 
occupancy (NSO) would also be designated as no 
ground disturbance (NGD) for other uses. 
 
Alternative C is denoted as the ‘preferred alternative’ 
throughout the Draft EIS/RMP (2007), and emphasizes 
comprehensive multiple resource management in the 
planning area, protecting sensitive resources while  
applying the most current information to allow the 
BLM to set priorities based on flexible and proactive 
public land management techniques. Commodity pro-
duction would be balanced against wildlife and vegeta-
tion protection, where exceptions could be granted ac-
cording to established adaptive criteria (see Appendix 
E, Draft EIS/RMP 2007).4 Area protections for sensi-
tive resources would be limited to areas where such 
designations are necessary, while special management 
prescriptions would be applied to areas without such 
designations. Existing SRMAs would remain in place, 
while additional SRMAs and backcountry areas would 
be identified to provide diverse recreational experi-
ences. More limitations and closures for off-highway 
vehicle (OHV) areas would occur, while some existing 
would stay in place. Areas considered no surface occu-
pancy (NSO) would also be designated as no ground 
disturbance (NGD), as in Alternative B. This alterna-
tive would be implemented using the adaptive manage-
ment approach, as outlined in Appendix M of the Draft 
EIS/RMP (2007).5  
 
Alternative D would allow the greatest extent of      
resource protection among the four resource manage-
ment alternatives, while still allowing resource use. 
Commodity production would be constrained to pro-
tect natural resource values or to accelerate their     
improvement, although exceptions would be granted 
within the guidelines of the adaptive criteria (see     
Appendix E, Draft EIS/RMP 2007).4 Wildlife habitat 
protections would increase with management objec-
tives focused on restoring vegetation communities to  
3 For information on revising the LSFO RMP see Chapter 1 of the Draft EIS/RMP 2007: http://www.co.blm.gov/lsra/rmp/
documents/04_LSDEIS_Chapter_1_SFS.pdf 
4 Appendix E of the Draft EIS/RMP: http://www.co.blm.gov/lsra/rmp/documents/AppE_LSDEIS_Exceptions_Mods_Waivers.pdf 
5 Appendix M of the Draft EIS/RMP: 
 http://www.co.blm.gov/lsra/rmp/documents/AppM_LSDEIS_Adaptive_Management.pdf  
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ecologically desirable levels. Designation of ACECs 
and WSRs would be maximized, with tighter restric-
tions in the designated areas to protect sensitive      
resources. Current SRMAs would stay in place while 
new SRMAs and backcountry areas would be desig-
nated to increase access to diverse recreational experi-
ences. Areas open to OHV use would be decreased, 
and as in Alternatives B and C, areas considered NSO 
for oil and gas would also be considered NGD for 
other uses.6 
 
Analysis of oil and natural gas activity in the Little 
Snake Field Office 
One of the major economic activities on LSFO lands is 
drilling and extracting natural gas and oil. The LSFO 
field office, in its Reasonable Foreseeable Develop-
ment (RFD) document, expects there to be signifi-
cantly more activity in the future than in the past, as 
2,221 wells currently exist but 3,031 wells could be 
drilled during the next twenty years. This is likely to 
create significant economic impacts. Moreover, there 
are numerous crossover effects and potential conflicts 
with other aspects of land management. For example, 
the existence of wells may impair the experience for 
hunters or hikers, which may affect visual resource 
management objectives within the plan. The construc-
tion of wells, access roads, and pipelines also disturbs 
the immediate ecology of an area, and in some analy-
ses, has been shown to have wider impacts on migra-
tion patterns of elk or nesting behavior of wildlife.  
Finally, significant water is pumped out of oil and gas 
wells, which is usually of low quality and must be   
disposed of or recirculated back underground, which 
may also have potential environmental effects. In   
general, there was not enough data to incorporate these 
effects in the analysis, so they are discussed qualita-
tively at the end of the section.  
 
The oil and gas industry consists of two primary     
sectors, drilling the wells to produce natural gas, oil, or 
both, and then an extraction activity, which occurs  
after the well has been drilled and the economic value 
has been determined. Oil wells are drilled in two 
phases: first the dry hole, or production phase, occurs, 
and afterwards a second completion stage is under-
taken if the possibility for adequate volumes of hydro-
carbons exists. We constructed two sectors to account 
for these phases, drilling and extraction/production. 
The drilling sector sells their output, a drilled well, to 
the second extraction sector, which pumps oil and 
natural gas from the ground under the well.  
 
Key assumptions used in the analysis  
As our IMPLAN model is just for one year, the sale of 
a drilled well is represented by its “amortized" value to 
the extraction sector, assuming that the well lasts thirty 
years and the discount rate is 6 percent.  
 
If a well appears to be economic, the second comple-
tion stage is added to condition the well for production. 
In this case, the cost is about $1.233 million dollars for 
the production stage, while the total costs for adding 
the completion stage is $0.818 million. The estimated 
prevalence of “dry” holes, which do not undergo the 
completion stage, is expected to be 20% of wells 
drilled over the life of the Plan (Conrath, RFD, 2004).  
 
The number of producing wells in LSFO during 2003 
was 881, which includes some wells that reach back 
many years. In total, 2,112 wells existed, some of 
which were over sixty years old. The production of oil 
per well in 2003 was 419 barrels and 2116 million  
cubic feet (MCF) of natural gas. There were just 29 
new wells drilled in 2002 and 59 in 2003. To get the 
average output value for each well, we used the prices 
from the RFD for 2002 at about $28 per barrel of oil 
and $3.80 per MCF of natural gas. These led to the 
average sales per well of $92,160 per well during 
2002, which was comprised of $80,422 sales of natural 
gas and $11,738 sales of oil, making the typical a gas 
well, with far greater income from sales of natural gas.  
 
In the next section, we present the approach used to 
determine the economic value of the increased oil and 
gas activity during the RMP time frame and also some 
issues in the analysis to this point.  
 
Determination of the simulation values  
A forecast of the increase in oil and gas activity 
throughout the life of the plan (20 years) is central to 
this analysis, as are the impacts of various restrictions 
on drilling. The forecasted number of wells to be 
drilled is taken from the RFD. The types of restrictions 
are summarized in the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act (EPCA) Table, which shows the acreage under 
various designations, including those related to       
seasonal restrictions and others related to stipulations 
on surface occupancy (Table 2). The acreage and     
 
6 For detailed descriptions of the four LSFO RMP alternatives see Chapter 2 of the Draft EIS/RMP: http://www.co.blm.gov/lsra/rmp/
documents/05_LSDEIS_Chapter_2_SFS.pdf 
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estimated natural gas and oil resources are reported for 
each designation and management alternative. This 
provides a starting point that, along with certain      
assumptions, can be used to determine the number of 
wells to be drilled and their associated costs.  
 
The general approach follows: We assume that there 
will be a “desired” average of 151 wells drilled per 
year to meet the RFD target of 3,031 wells put in place 
during the twenty-year period of the plan. The immedi-
ate questions are about how to determine under which 
designations these wells will be drilled, how much they 
will cost, and, indeed, whether all 151 wells will be 
drilled each year. We assume first that companies will 
target areas where they can get the greatest amount of 
natural gas (as gas is about three times more prevalent 
as oil in Moffat County), so wells would likely be 
placed in the designated areas following the propor-
tions of total availability of gas (Table 2). Thus, in  
Alternative A, there are 11.2 million BCF in total iden-
tified gas resources under the various designations and, 
of that, 3.2 million BCF, or 28.8% of the gas, is found 
under acreage with 6-9 month seasonal restrictions. 
Gas companies will thus try to drill 28.8% of the wells 
within that area, with higher costs than if that resource 
had been under the open lease stipulation.  
 
Several of the designations require special attention or 
can be merged with others. First, the acreage facing 
cumulative timing stipulations of less than three 
months is merged with the open lease designation, as 
there is little acreage in that category and also only a 
small amount of gas to be found (see Row 3, Table 2). 
(In fact, the desired number of wells in this designation 
averages to zero across all alternatives.) Likewise,  
designations with stipulations greater than nine months 
are quite restrictive, so much so that it appears best to 
make that small amount of acreage and possible gas 
recovery added to the “closed to leasing” section.  
 
Cost variations across designations  
Each other designation will lead to varying drilling 
costs and will affect the decision of companies about 
whether to drill. The first is the open lease with stan-
dard terms, which is modeled as the “base”, with its 
costs reported below. Drilling in areas with this stipu-
lation offer the lowest costs to operators. The open 
leases with surface control, the second category in the 
table, will be modeled by increasing construction costs 
by 20%, as these stipulations often require adjustment 
in location, land preparation or reclamation.  
 
There are two categories of seasonal restrictions, 3-6 
months and 6-9 months. It is clear that if firms are  
restricted to drilling during a short period, in the aggre-
gate there needs to be more drilling rigs and crews 
available to meet that demand. In general, it takes 
about 20 days to drill a well with a team of 7-10 work-
ers, including professional and overhead staff. One 
crew can then drill 16-17 wells per year. This means 
that it takes ten crews to do the 151 wells assumed in 
this analysis. For the first seasonal designation, we  
assume that the restrictions are about 4.5 months, the 
mid point of the 3-6 month range. This implies that the 
increases in labor and rigs needed would be about 
35%. The availability of these rigs would be a factor of 
how much of a region faces these limits, the general 
tightness in supply due to national drilling levels, and 
other factors that are quite difficult to forecast. In alter-
natives A and C, areas with seasonal restrictions con-
tain over half of the gas resources.  
 
To implement these restrictions, we assume that the 
prices of rig-related capital and labor increase by one 
quarter of the increase in the required stock of rigs and 
workers. This leads to an increase in selected costs of 
8.25% for the 3-6 month timing restriction. A similar 
process would suggest that 7.5 month restrictions on 
average for the 6-9 month designation would lead to a 
17.5% change in those costs. In addition, there might 
be wells that are “caught” in the middle of construction 
as the restriction goes into effect, so that capital is tied 
up for several months in partially finished wells. It was 
estimated by Julander Energy sources that this might 
be 10% of wells during the 3-6 month seasonal restric-
tions and 25% of wells drilled in the 6-9 month desig-
nation. These added financial costs are also incorpo-
rated in the simulations. (In both cases, it is assumed 
that production costs listed in a later table need to be 
financed for 4.5 months and 7.5 months respectively, 
at an 8% interest rate).  
 
The last three lines show various designations that are 
continuous throughout the year. Clearly, no wells will 
be drilled in those areas with “No Leasing” restric-
tions. Also, BLM has determined that wells in the un-
recoverable No Surface Occupancy (NSO) must be 
drilled too far away from gas resources to make eco-
nomic sense. The wells that companies would like to 
drill in these areas simply will not be attempted. How-
ever, the recoverable NSO areas listed in the EPCA 
table (Table 2) could be potentially accessed but at 
higher costs. BLM has argued that the horizontal and  
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directional drilling required in these NSO areas would 
increase costs by 36%. 
 
This analysis will incorporate these varying costs of 
drilling in two ways. First, we reduce the number of 
wells drilled in response to increased costs of drilling 
using a core of concept from economics called the sup-
ply elasticity. Moreover, we adjust the budgets pre-
sented in the following section to reflect the higher 
costs assumed above for the various scenarios. Supply 
elasticities describe the response to an increase in 
prices or costs. In our case the increases are in input 
costs, which lower the profitability of drilling a well, 
and therefore the likelihood that it will be undertaken. 
Results from the literature show that price (not cost) 
elasticities run from 0.4 to 1.6 depending on the time 
frame incorporated, and the product being produced. 
The interpretation is based on percentage responses, so 
an elasticity of 0.75 says that, given a ten percent    
increase in prices, there will be an increase in wells 
drilled of 7.5 percent, or that the response is three 
quarters as great as the increase in costs. 
 
We found no articles giving input cost elasticities, so 
the output elasticity values found in the literature are 
used as starting points but are given an opposite direc-
tion. Thus, as the costs of producing a well increase, 
the number of wells drilled will decrease. From discus-
sions, it appears that the increases in costs would still 
leave profitable opportunities in many cases, at least 
given high prices for gas and oil that might exist in the 
future, so that many operators would continue to drill. 
However, some high-cost operators, or those with bet-
ter possibilities in other fields, might not choose to 
drill in face of the cost increases assumed for the vari-
ous designations. However, with higher prices, and 
developed infrastructure to transport the gas, many 
wells will be added despite higher costs. Thus we use a 
relatively low elasticity of 0.5 to capture the response 
of wells to the higher costs in this analysis. 
 
In Table 3 we show how wells might be distributed 
under each alternative and designation reported in the 
EPCA table, taking into account variations in the eco-
nomic costs in the different areas. The first panel 
shows the distribution of the “desired” wells across the 
various designations. Because each alternative differs 
with regard to the acreage placed in various designa-
tions, the natural gas resource in the mineral estate  
below the acreage varies as well. We assume that  
companies will initially want to drill where there is the  
greatest likelihood of obtaining natural gas, irrespec-
tive of where the reserves fall. Thus, in Alternative A, 
about 29% of the total natural gas is found in areas 
which are open to leasing under standard terms, so that 
firms would want to put 44 of 151 wells in those areas 
during a typical year, prior to the economics being 
taken into account. In Alternative B, where far more 
land is open without restriction for almost all of the 
acreage and natural gas underneath, nearly all wells 
(140) would be drilled in these areas, with few in areas 
with any other designation. There is in fact little area 
contained at all in these other designations. In Alterna-
tive D, there are far more restrictions, so oil companies 
are faced with drilling in higher cost designations more 
often.  
 
As noted in the earlier section, firms will be less at-
tracted to areas where there are high costs imposed, 
and at the margin, fewer firms will drill in the higher 
cost areas. The response is summarized, again as cov-
ered earlier, in the supply elasticity with respect to an 
increase in costs (which is assumed to be -0.5). The 
percentage increases in costs is given in the middle 
panel of Table 3, along with the number of wells that 
are not drilled, either because resources are unrecover-
able or because higher costs induce a negative reaction 
within the industry. The added costs amount to only 
1.35% for surface control, but they climb by 25.3% 
when there are restrictions of 6-9 months. In addition, 
there are areas with unrecoverable resources or which 
are closed entirely to leasing. As a result, fewer than 
the 151 expected wells are put into place in all Alterna-
tives except B.  
 
The table shows that there is no penalty from higher 
costs in Alternative B, but this grows to 52 wells in 
Alternative D, over one third of the initial expected 
wells, where there are extensive restrictions on drilling. 
The alternatives A and C are nearly the same, as they 
have designations that lead to a reduction in 15 and 18 
wells respectively. The bottom panel gives the net 
number of wells to be drilled by designation, and    
taking the economic reactions to higher costs into   
account.  
 
Estimated budgets for drilling and extraction 
The budgets in Table 4 are taken from an Authority for 
Expenditures (AFE) provided from industry sources 
and converted into the IMPLAN sectoring scheme to 
derive the costs of drilling each well. The extraction 
budget was taken from IMPLAN, as it appeared to be  
 





















































Table 3: Hypothesized distribution of wells drilled by BLM Mgt. alternative and designation 
Initial distribution of wells without impact and restrictions 
  BLM Management Alternatives 
  A B C D 
Open Lease 44 140 43 21 
Open subject Surface control 8 9 10 1 
3-6 month seasonal limits 42 1 40 35 
6-9 month seasonal limits 45 1 47 39 
Recoverable NSO 4 0 6 14 
Nonrecoverable NSO 2 0 3 29 
No Leasing 5 0 1 12 
Total 151 151 150 151 
Reduction in wells due to being unrecoverable or costly 
  BLM Management Alternatives 
  A B C D % Increase in 
Costs 
Open Lease 0 0 0 0 -- 
Open subject Surface control 0 0 0 0 1.35 
3-6 month seasonal limits 5 0 4 4 21.6 
6-9 month seasonal limits 6 0 6 5 25.3 
Recoverable NSO 0 0 1 2 24.4 
Nonrecoverable NSO 2 0 3 29 -- 
No Leasing 5 0 1 12 -- 
Total 18 0 15 52   
Based on an input cost elasticity of 0.5         
Net Wells Drilled (No.) 
  BLM Management Alternatives 
  A B C D 
Open Lease 44 140 43 21 
Open subject Surface control 8 9 10 1 
3-6 month seasonal limits 38 1 36 31 
6-9 month seasonal limits 40 1 41 34 
recoverable NSO 3 0 5 12 
Nonrecoverable NSO 0 0 0 0 
No Leasing 0 0 0 0 
Total 132 151 135 99 
 

























































reasonable. Only the extraction levels were increased 
to match known values from the RFD and conversa-
tions with Fred Conrath of the BLM.  
 
The key assumptions used in creating the drilling 
budget are presented below. First, we used a represen-
tative AFE (Authority for Expenditure) for 8,500 feet, 
which came from the Peance Basin, not identical but 
similar to the Cretaceous Seas that formed deposits in 
Moffat County. This was adjusted through conversa-
tions with Dick Pate of Julander Energy. The costs 
were converted from this AFE into our 29 sector 
grouping for IMPLAN for two categories, the dry hole 
phase, which is required for all wells, and the comple-
tion phase, which is only undertaken when there is 
enough evidence that there will be sufficient resources 
found. After the completion drilling is finished, there is 
the ongoing servicing and extraction of hydrocarbons 
from the wells. The structure of the budgets is such 
that the extraction phase “purchases” a completed well 
from the drilling phase, but it is just an amortized por-
tion that is charged to a given year. We further assume 
that these costs reflect the “base” costs of drilling with-
out any restrictions.  
Table 4: Moffat County estimated gas drilling, completion and extraction budgets 
Sales/Production Per well  1,191,741  892,996  92,146 
  Individual Well Cost ($) 
      Costs by Sector Dry Hole Completion Extraction 
Crop      23 
Pasture       
   Cattle       
   Other Animal       
Other Agriculture       
Coal       
Power      34 
Water  51,490    931 
Heavy Construction  112,735  27,500  34 
Oil Gas Drilling  388,000  317,900  68 
Oil Gas Extraction  36,000    32,770 
Manufacturing  302,936  352,146  9,194 
Wholesale trade   -  3,224 
Transport  3,500  65,620  2,497 
Retailing   -  4,461 
Food/Bev. Retailing   -  57 
Communication   -  11 
Finance Insurance Real Estate  74,000  49,075  454 
Professional Services  44,000    1,146 
Health   -  8,070 
Recreation   -  - 
Outfitters   -  45 
Hotels   -  - 
Food Services   -  68 
Other Services  5,000 -  114 
Government   -  488 
      Total      63,746 
        
Employee Compensation  43,500  31,250  9,858 
Proprietor income  110,580  28,505  8,919 
Proprietor Income  20,000  21,000  6,034 
Business Taxes    -  3,589 
Total Costs  1,191,741  892,996  92,146 
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Results of oil and gas simulations  
The results in this section assess the impacts of the oil 
and gas simulations from two separate perspectives. 
The analysis first looks at the drilling phase, and shows 
the annual impacts for a typical year during the Plan 
period. The numbers of wells drilled varies by manage-
ment alternative, as described in Table 3. The second 
part of the presentation is the ongoing extraction phase. 
This analysis is placed ten years into the plan as well, 
when up to 1,510 wells have been drilled (in Alterna-
tive B); however, with 20 percent dry holes, the num-
ber of new producing wells for that alternative is 
1,208.  
 
There is also significant variation across alternatives: 
in alternative D, the pro-environmental alternative, 
there are only 99 wells drilled per year, so that after ten 
years, taking into account twenty percent dry holes, 
there are just 792 wells in production. The other alter-
natives are intermediate versions: the annual drilling of 
132 wells in Alternative A leads to 1,056 wells, while, 
in Alternative C, the 135 wells drilled on average leads 
to 1,080 wells that extract natural gas and oil ten years 
after the Plan has been initiated. Again, the analysis 
will present the annual results for a typical year ten 
years in the future. The stipulations described in the 
EPCA table (Table 2) affect costs of drilling, but much 
less so for extraction. Once the wells are drilled, most 
impacts from BLM stipulations are finished, while the 
large extraction stream endures for many years. While 
separated, these two phases are, in general, discussed 
together.  
It is clear that the sales values of drilling up to 151 
wells each year are high, as the direct impacts range  
from $223 to $294 million in value. (These values 
make sense, as each well costs about $2 million if 
completed and there are up to 151 wells drilled in a 
typical year). The reasons that these vary are related to 
the number of wells that are not drilled, as shown in 
Table 3, which shows the reduction in drilling based 
on costs or accessibility to resources. It is also due to 
having more wells in designations with higher costs, 
which can only be justified if there are higher sales 
values. (“Sales” in this case are really the value of the 
wells transferred into the extraction phase). An inter-
esting dimension of this analysis is that higher indirect 
and induced sales values can be obtained in scenarios 
with higher costs, or more restrictive designations. 
Thus, the overall values in Table 5 in Alternative A 
and C exceed those in Alternative B. The higher costs 
imposed by the designations lead to higher costs and 
therefore higher sales values. The multipliers are from 
1.3 (Alternative B) to 1.4, which are reasonable given 
the type of industry and small geographical area con-
sidered.  
 
The extraction phase is based on the number of pro-
ducing wells, which vary considerably across alterna-
tive. The pattern of sales in this activity follows the 
number of installed wells more closely than in the 
drilling phase, as costs are the same across all alterna-
tives. Thus, the largest number of wells, and conse-
quently sales, is drilled in Alternative B. The multiplier  
effects are however very small, at about 1.06 in all  
 
 
Table 5: Impact analysis results on total annual sales (US$ Millions) 
   BLM Management Alternatives 
 Categories  A  B  C  D 
 Oil and Gas Drilling       
 Direct Impact 287.871 288.126 294.488 296.779 
 Indirect Impact 89.134 62.469 91.210 74.445 
 Induced Impact 25.772 26.454 26.400 19.816 
 Total Impact 402.778 377.049 412.098 317.286 
 Oil and Gas Extraction       
 Direct Impact 146.000 167.000 149.300 109.500 
 Indirect Impact 5.074 5.803 5.188 3.805 
 Induced Impact 3.690 4.221 3.773 2.767 
 Total Impact 154.764 177.024 158.262 116.073 
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cases. Local sales are therefore not stimulated very 
much during this phase. 
 
The employment values reported in Table 6 are quite 
high, and they come mainly from indirect and induced 
effects. These come from purchases of inputs by drill-
ing and extraction industries and the added expendi-
tures of laborers and households. For instance, the  
direct employment effects account for only 91 employ-
ees in Alternative A, while the indirect and induced 
effects add an incredible 778 persons, implying a very 
high multiplier of 9.55. Following the same logic, that 
higher costs create higher demand for inputs, the total 
employment across the alternatives in the drilling 
phase is not driven simply by the number of wells  
 
drilled, so that the total in Alternative C of 891 persons 
exceeds that in Alternative B despite the greater num-
ber of wells drilled in B. For extraction, the direct em-
ployment effects add only 15 employees in Alternative 
D, while the indirect and induced effects add another 
60 persons, implying a still high multiplier of 5.0. 
Again, the employment in the extraction phase, while 
having high multipliers, still seems to follow the gen-
eral pattern related to the number of installed wells in 
the various alternatives. 
 
While these multipliers are very high, we believe that 
they are viable. First, they are associated with other 
multipliers, such as value added and sales, which are 
very plausible. Secondly, these two sectors have the  
highest output-labor ratios of any industries in the 
county. So, for example, the output: labor ratio is $2.77 
million: 1 laborer in oil drilling and $1.33 million: 1  
laborer in oil extraction. By comparison, in coal it is 
$231 thousand: 1 laborer and $96 thousand: 1 laborer 
in construction. The implication is that few laborers are 
used in the oil industries compared to other sectors in 
the county. However, these industries are expected to 
grow considerably and attain high sales and input pur-
chases levels. Thus even with very low local pur-
chases, the values are high and the created indirect and 
induced employment will be high, especially relative 
to the small direct value. Thus, large multipliers make 
sense.  
 
Table 7 contains the value added figures, which pre-
sent patterns similar to the sales and employment    
tables. The pattern of value added in the drilling phase 
does not strictly follow the number of wells, but is  
affected by the costs of production as well, while in 
production (or extraction) of oil and gas, value added 
is correlated clearly with the numbers of wells drilled. 
Alternative B provides total value added of $26.9 mil-
lion, while Alternative D provides only $17.6 million. 
The most notable part of the value added is its small 
size, which suggests that the ongoing contribution to 
the local economy is small relative to its nominal size. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 show the contributions to taxes by  
level of government for the two phases of oil and gas 
activity. In Alternatives A, B and C, total tax receipts 
are over $25 million for drilling, but are closer to $20 
million for Alternative D. As in other cases, the  
greater part of tax revenue is related to income and 
profit taxes and are Federal receipts. The local entities 
and State receive nearly the same amounts from drill-
ing operations. About 82.5% of all tax receipts attrib-
uted to this sector go to the Federal government, with 
the State of Colorado receiving 9.3% of the taxes gen-
erated, while the local county and city take is about 
8.1%.  
 
Table 6: Impact analysis results on employment 
  BLM Management Alternatives 
Categories A B C D 
 Oil and Gas Drilling       
 Direct Impact  91  104  93  68 
 Indirect Impact  446  434  457  349 
 Induced Impact  332  341  340  256 
 Total Impact  869  879  891  672 
 Oil and Gas Extraction       
 Direct Impact  20  23  20  15 
 Indirect Impact  32  37  33  24 
 Induced Impact  48  54  49  36 
 Total Impact  100  114  102  75 
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In regard to the extraction, or production phases of the 
industry, the total receipts are far smaller, but the pro-
portions across government entities are similar to the 
drilling phase. One notable aspect of these tables is 
that the amount going to local entities is fairly consis-
tent with values reported in the baseline report, which 
showed approximately $1.0 million received by Moffat 
County from oil and gas-related taxes. These come 
from a combination of the extraction activity and  
 
 
drilling operations. Thus, moving into the future,    
localities could expect an added $1.0 million in tax 
revenues as the industry doubles by adding 1,000  
producing wells. Of course, this revenue stream will    
require continued drilling to be achieved, and there 
will certainly by significant added government costs 




 Table 7: Impact analysis results on total value added (US$ Millions) 
   BLM Management Alternatives 
 Categories  A  B  C  D 
 Oil and Gas Drilling       
 Direct Impact 29.307 33.401 29.822 22.249 
 Indirect Impact 28.140 25.251 28.742 22.659 
 Induced Impact 15.167 15.592 15.453 11.845 
 Total Impact 72.614 74.244 74.018 56.754 
 Oil and Gas Extraction       
 Direct Impact 15.124 17.301 15.468 11.343 
 Indirect Impact 4.060 4.646 4.154 3.045 
 Induced Impact 4.341 4.964 4.438 3.255 
 Total Impact 23.525 26.911 24.060 17.644 
 
Table 8: Oil and gas drilling's expenditures effects on taxes (US$ Millions) 
  BLM Alternatives 
  A B C D 
Federal taxes         
 Employee taxes 3.218 3.251 3.298 2.484 
 Corporate taxes 1.954 3.046 2.002 1.500 
 Household/sales taxes 15.778 15.134 16.162 12.138 
 Indirect Business taxes 0.769 0.751 0.790 0.591 
 Sub-total federal taxes 21.719 22.182 22.252 16.714 
State taxes         
 Employee taxes 0.130 0.131 0.133 0.100 
 Corporate taxes 0.403 0.410 0.414 0.311 
 Household/sales taxes 1.196 1.225 1.225 0.920 
 Indirect Business taxes 0.727 0.710 0.747 0.559 
 Sub-total state taxes 2.456 2.476 2.519 1.890 
Local (City and County) taxes         
 Indirect Business taxes 2.006 1.959 2.062 1.544 
 Household/sales taxes 0.135 0.138 0.138 0.104 
Sub-total local taxes 2.140 2.097 2.200 1.647 
Sub-total state and local taxes 4.597 4.573 4.719 3.538 
Federal, state and local taxes 26.316 26.755 26.972 20.251 
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The final two tables, Tables 10 and 11, show in detail 
how various sectors in the economy are affected by the 
economic presence of the oil and gas industry. They 
first show the direct effects, which, in this case, are 
simply the value added created by the oil and gas drill-
ing and production activities. These purchases lead to a 
series of indirect effects, which are given in the third 
columns of the tables. The sectors benefiting the most, 
indirectly, through purchases by the oil and gas drilling 
industry are government (somewhat mysteriously), the 
oil drilling industry itself, construction, power, coal, 
manufacturing, and finance, insurance and real estate 
(FIRE). These industries receive more than $2.0 mil-
lion in value added as a result of the activity of the 
drilling industry. There are a large number of other 
sectors that benefit from purchases by drilling opera-
tions as well. 
 
An examination of the induced effects, which arise 
from purchases by laborers hired as a result of direct 
and indirect impacts, shows a quite different pattern, 
but one that is consistent with the economic contribu-
tion of consumers purchasing goods and services with 
their received labor income. The largest industries  




very sectors that account for large purchases by    
workers. The other induced effects reflect the wide 
variety of sectors related to the range of purchases that 
families and consumers make.  
 
The extraction industry portrays a significantly differ-
ent pattern of indirect effects, which leads to benefits 
to services, wholesale trade, power, transport, and oil 
drilling, which each receive more than $100,000 in 
value added from purchases related to oil production 
activities. The induced effects, which are related to the 
purchases by the households who received labor and 
capital income, are the same in both cases, and indeed, 
across the entire analysis.  
 
Important economic factors not reflected in the 
simulations  
Aspects of seasonal restrictions 
Seasonal restrictions create a number of complexities 
for the analysis that are not, in general, included in the 
modeling but are nonetheless important. First, there are 
different perspectives on the actual costs of seasonal 
restrictions, and secondly there are socio-cultural as-
pects of seasonal restrictions. Each of these restrictions 
is discussed on the following page. 
 
Table 9: Oil and gas extraction effects on taxes (US$ Millions) 
  BLM Alternatives 
  A B C D 
Federal taxes         
 Employee taxes  0.331  0.379  0.339  0.249 
 Corporate taxes  0.190  0.217  0.194  0.142 
 Household/sales taxes  1.496  1.712  1.530  1.123 
 Indirect Business taxes  0.215  0.246  0.220  0.161 
 Sub-total federal taxes  2.232  2.554  2.283  1.675 
State taxes         
 Employee taxes  0.013  0.015  0.014  0.010 
 Corporate taxes  0.047  0.053  0.048  0.035 
 Household/sales taxes  0.113  0.130  0.116  0.085 
 Indirect Business taxes  0.203  0.233  0.208  0.153 
 Sub-total state taxes  0.377  0.431  0.385  0.283 
Local (City and County) taxes       
 Indirect Business taxes  0.561  0.642  0.574  0.421 
 Household/sales taxes  0.013  0.015  0.013  0.010 
Sub-total local taxes  0.574  0.657  0.587  0.431 
Sub-total state and local total  0.951  1.088  0.972  0.713 
Federal, state and local total  3.183  3.641  3.255  2.388 
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The first perspective has to do with the foregone reve-
nues from a seasonal restriction. The main cost of 
course is that a well will not be completed. The issue 
then is what costs are increased and what revenues are 
foregone. As noted earlier, suppose that the production 
phase of a well has been incurred but the completion 
phase cannot be finished due to the seasonal restric-
tion. Clearly, the well will miss the revenue stream 
from that year, and, if it is winter, when natural gas 
prices are the highest, an opportunity will be lost for 
selling at the seasonal high point. The question is what 
the actual costs are, which can be seen from the sales 





First, in regard to sales of gas, the key issue would be 
that the resource is still in the ground, so that it could 
be sold the next year. (Contrast this with the situation 
in fresh fruit, where, if a season is missed, the value of 
production is lost forever). Thus, the income stream is 
deferred by one year. Depending on prices of natural 
gas in the future, this missed year of output could lead 
to either higher or lower revenues, but the determina-
tion of this effect is beyond the scope of this research. 
The main cost associated with this deferral is that    
access to monetary resources from sales is reduced by 
one year and thus firms must borrow. The actual cost is 
thus the interest on the borrowed funds equivalent to 
one year of output of the well.  
Table 10: Sector level direct, indirect and induced impacts on value added for the oil and 
gas drilling industry (BLM Alternative C , by Expenditure Category in US$ Millions)  
  Impacts  
Categories Direct Indirect Induced Total
Housing Services 0.000  3.112  3.112 
Government 5.449 0.615  6.064 
Oil Gas Drilling  32.253 4.161 0.001  36.416 
Heavy Construction 4.007 0.033  4.040 
FIRE 3.463 1.110  4.573 
Manufacturing 2.541 0.172  2.713 
Coal 2.458 0.179  2.637 
Power 1.887 0.625  2.512 
Services 1.607 0.858  2.465 
Transport 1.479 0.198  1.678 
Oil Gas Production 1.100 0.071  1.172 
Wholesale Trade 0.902 0.862  1.764 
Water 0.571 0.016  0.587 
Retailing 0.504 2.738  3.242 
Other Services 0.397 1.031  1.428 
Communication 0.215 0.378  0.593 
Food/Bev. Retailing 0.082 0.523  0.605 
Hotels 0.060 0.212  0.272 
Recreation 0.053 0.006  0.059 
Food Services 0.045 0.621  0.666 
Cattle 0.038  0.006  0.044 
Other Animal 0.027 0.013  0.040 
Pasture 0.024 0.005  0.029 
Other Agriculture 0.010 0.007  0.017 
Health 0.001 3.321  3.322 
Crop 0.001 0.001  0.002 
Total  32.253 31.085 16.713  80.051 
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On the cost side, there are also financial resources that 
are tied up, so that costs have been incurred but cannot 
be covered by revenues. There is, moreover, a problem 
in that increased resources are required in aggregate 
because more workers and drilling rigs, etc. must exist 
to meet the restricted window of drilling. This is hard 
to assess, however, because it requires an understand-
ing of the wider regional and national markets. Indeed, 
we have made assumptions on increased costs and the 
consequent reduction in production, which we incorpo-
rated in the model. Thus, we conclude that the main 
added costs of seasonal restrictions not in our model 
are the deferred revenues.  
 
Socio-cultural effects of oil and gas seasonal  
restrictions  
One critical issue noted by NWCOS participants, but 
which is not included in this analysis, is the need to use 
more temporary workers when there are seasonal    
restrictions. These laborers cannot obtain permanent 
employment throughout the year, so they would not  
 
live in Moffat County, but would be migrants who 
might be housed in temporary quarters. They would 
not make the expenditures that permanent residents do, 
and, without that vested interest, little service to the 
community would be seen and the likelihood of      
increased negative social behavior often associated 
with these migrants might be seen, including drugs and 
other anti-social behavior. This would add costs to the 
seasonal restrictions to the community that would not 
be faced by the operating firms.  
 
Impacts on the effects in migration patterns and 
deterioration of the other resources  
One aspect of oil and natural gas production and drill-
ing is effects on the migration patterns of large game. 
Studies recently have noted changes in migration pat-
terns and deleterious effects on availability of large 
game within the areas being drilled. This could rea-
sonably be expected to have negative effects on the 
harvest of hunters, but it was not possible to get suffi-
cient detail to make predictions. The migration patterns  
 
Table 11: Sector level direct, indirect and induced impacts on value added for oil extraction 
(BLM Alternative C, by Expenditure Category in US$ Millions) 
  Impacts  
Categories Direct Indirect Induced Total
 Services  0.363 0.082  0.445 
 Wholesale Trade  0.224 0.082  0.307 
 Power  0.170 0.059  0.229 
 Transport  0.151 0.019  0.169 
 Oil Gas Drilling  0.127 0.000  0.128 
 Oil Gas Production   5.544 0.095 0.007  5.646 
 Government  0.084 0.059  0.142 
 FIRE   0.076 0.106  0.182 
 Other Services  0.042 0.098  0.140 
 Communication  0.039 0.036  0.075 
 Coal  0.030 0.018  0.048 
 Manufacturing  0.024 0.017  0.041 
 Heavy Construction  0.018 0.003  0.021 
 Retailing  0.017  0.260  0.277 
 Hotels  0.011 0.020  0.031 
 Food Services  0.010 0.059  0.070 
 Food/Bev. Retailing  0.003 0.050  0.052 
 Health  0.000 0.315  0.316 
 Housing Services  0.000 0.296  0.296 
 Others  0.005 0.005  0.010 
 Total   5.544 1.489 1.591  8.624 
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of elk, location of wells, and the coefficients relating 
the two were simply not known, so we simply note  
that this could be a negative effect of oil and gas    
drilling. The other effect that is not included in the 
model is the impact on hunters’ experience from   
hunting in areas where the vista is dotted with gas    













































Other resources such as water quality and surrounding 
streams and ponds might be affected, as will the ecol-
ogy of areas around drilling pads, and those that are 
found near access roads that might provide greater  
opportunities for off-highway vehicle (OHV) activity. 
These aspects will be extended in the next versions of 
this document. 
 
 
